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a possibility of reverter. In addition statutes in other jurisdictions
similar to West Virginia's have been construed to render rights of
re-entry and possibilities of reverter alienable. 3
The court left little doubt that a possibility of reverter is considered alienable. Such a conclusion is prompted by its adoption of
the Carney case in addition to the reasons already enunciated. The
court in Carney stated that a "possibility of resulting trust" was
"somewhat in analogy to a possibility of reverter," and then held that
a "possibility of resulting trust" was transferable under the statute
of descent. It went on to say that such an interest is transferable by
devise or bequest and also by alienation inter vivos.
The issue of the alienability of a right of re-entry would seem
to be muddled by Judge Brannon's dissenting opinion in the White
case, where he stated that our conveyance statute did not apply to
a right of re-entry "because it requires some estate or actual interest
for the foundation of a claim to come under this statute." However,
as pointed out in Zane, Brannon reached such a conclusion by
following the rule of the New York cases including Upington v.
Corrigan.4 By rejecting that rule the court in effect rejected Brannon's conclusions, since the basis of such a conclusion was destroyed.
In addition to maintaining that a possibility of reverter and a
right of re-entry are both inheritable under our descent statute, Zane
also lays important groundwork for a decision affirming the alienability of these interests under West Virginia's conveyance statute.
Such a decision would be in accord with a growing tendency to
reject all vestiges of the early common law regarding the transferability of these two future interests.
John R. Frazier
Taxation-Employment Agency Fees
Deductible as a Business Expense
Petitioner-taxpayer was employed by a corporation as secretarytreasurer. In May 1966 petitioner sought new employment and for
this purpose contacted an employment agency, paying their nonrefundable fee which amounted to approximately $3000. Through
33 See Fayette County v. Morton, 282 Ky. 481, 138 S.W.2d 953 (1940);
Hamilton v. Jackson, 157 Miss. 284, 127 So. 302 (1930); Davis v. Skipper,
125 Tex. 364, 83 S.W.2d 318 (1935). See also Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 224 at
§§ 3, 5 (1957).
34 151 N.Y. 143, 45 N.E. 359 (1896).
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the agency's efforts, petitioner obtained employment with a second
corporation as secretary-controller. Petitioner sought to deduct the
$3000 from his 1966 income tax return as an "Employment Agency
Fee", but this deduction was disallowed by the Internal Revenue
Service. The Service held that the $3000 was not an allowable
deduction under either section 162' or 2122 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, but was a nondeductible personal expense. In the
Tax Court, held, that the expenditure was incurred by petitioner in
carrying on his trade or business of being a corporate executive. A
fee paid to secure employment is deductible as an ordinary and
necessary business expense. David 1. Primuth, 54 T.C. 374 (1970).
Ambiguity and inconsistency persist in the area of the tax law
under consideration in Primuth-the deductibility of expenses incurred in seeking and/or securing employment. There have been several
contradictory rulings on whether such expenses are deductible as
ordinary and necessary business expenses or as expenses incurred
in the production of income. In a 1920 ruling, the Treasury Department held "fees paid to secure employment" to be allowable deductions.3 However, a 1922 ruling held that expenses incurred in
seeking employment were personal expenses and therefore were not
deductible from gross income. 4 These rulings apparently played
a significant part in forming the basis of the courts' past rulings
which held that expenses incurred while securing employment were
deductible while those incurred seeking employment were not.'
This distinction is clearly expressed in Thomas W. Ryan,6 where
the court said that expenditures made while seeking employment
were "clearly nondeductible, as established by judicial precedents
and by the regulations."" The courts have ruled on this subject
(deductibility) on numerous occasions, their decisions being in
IINr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162: 'Trade or Business Expenses. (a)
In general.-There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and
necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on
a trade or business .... "
2 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 212: "Expenses for Production of Income.
In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a deduction all
the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year(1) for the production or collection of income ....
3 O.D. 579, 3 Cum. BuLL. 130 (1920) provides: "Fees paid to secure
employment are considered allowable deductions for the purpose of computing
net income subject to tax."
4 I.T. 1397, 1-2 Cum. BULL. 145 (1922).
5
See, e.g., Morris v. Commissioner, 423 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1970), affg
26 CCH TAx Cr. MEM. 1296 (1967); Eugene A. Carter, 51 T.C. 932 (1969).
67 18 CCH TAx CT. MEsm. 580 (1959).
Id. at 583.
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accord with Ryan.8 Futhermore, the Treasury Regulations also
provide that such expenses are not deductible."
In 1960 a series of rulings was handed down which confused
the issue further. The Treasury Department, revoking a previous
ruling'" which allowed deductions of expenses incurred in securing
employment, held that employment agency fees were not deductible.' This ruling stated that section 262 of the Code 2 prohibited
the deduction of personal, living, or family expenses, and further
noted a long standing position of the Service that expenses incurred
in seeking employment were personal in nature, and therefore not
deductible. Moreover, the ruling held that there was no distinction
between money expended in ieeking employment and that expended
in securing employment. This ruling was revoked approximately
two months later by Revenue Ruling 223 which stated that "the
Internal Revenue Service will continue to allow deductions for fees

paid to employment agencies for securing employment,"" (but not
for seeking).
The reasons given by the courts for holding employment agency
fees nondeductible appear to be two-fold. First, a job-seeker is not
engaged in any trade or business, and therefore the agency fee is
not an expense incurred pursuant to a trade or business, as required
by statute;'" second, a distinction drawn between expenses incurred
in seeking employment and those incurred in securing employment.' 5
These grounds for denial of the deduction are not persuasive.
8 See Paul C. Sequin, 26 CCH TAx Cr. MEM. 950 (1967); Francois Louis,
25 CCH TAX Cr. MEM. 1047 (1966); William Galindos, 14 CCH TAx CT.
MEM. 303 (1955); Leon Chooluck, 13 CCH TAX Cr. MEM. 864 (1954);
Raymond L. Collier, 13 CCH TAX Cr. MEM. 857 (1954).
9 Treas. Reg. § 1.212(f) (1957), in pertinent part provides:
"(f) Among expenditures not allowable as deductions under
section 212 are the following: . . . expenses such as those paid or
incurred in seeking employment or in placing oneself in a position
to0 begin rendering personal services for compensation.
1 O.D. 579, 3 Cum. BuLL. 130 (1920).
1"Rev. Rul. 158, 1960-1 CuM. BULL. 140.
12INT. RV.CODE oF 1954 § 262.
3 Rev. Rul. 223, 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 57. (emphasis added).
S4 E.g., Morton Frank, 20 T.C. 511 (1953) where it was held that expenses incurred in investigating and looking for a new business were not
deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses in carrying on a trade
or business. See also, Harold Haft, 40 T.C. 2 (1963) where the court held
that a salesman who had worked 25 years did not cease to be in the jewelry
business
simply because he was temporarily unemployed.
'5 See Morris v. Commissioner 423 F.2d. 611 (9th Cir. 1970), ajJ'g,
26 CCH TAX CT.MEM. 1296 (1967); Eugene A. Carter, 51 T.C. 932 (1969).
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It was held in Peoples-PittsburghTrust Co. 6 that a taxpayer's business could be that of being an employee and that expenses incurred
in that relation are ordinary and necessary expenses of such business.
Thus the job-seeking expenses in Primuth were held to have been
incurred pursuant to a trade or business, that of being a corporate
executive. 7 This leaves the distinction between expenses incurred
in seeking employment and actually securing employment as the main
cause of confusion in cases preceding Primuth. This distinction is
clearly illustrated by the court in its decision in Eugene A. Carter8
where, discussing the language of Revenue Ruling 223,9 it said:

[T]his language was not intended to permit the deduction
of a fee where the employment agency merely seeks to
locate a position for the taxpayer ... but was intended to

allow a deduction only where the agency actually obtains a
position for the taxpayer.2"
This language was upheld by the ninth circuit in the case of Morris
v. Commissioner2' where the court held that "the distinction
recognized... is between expenses incurred in seeking and preparing
for new work, which are not deductible, and expenses incurred in
seeking and performing such work, which . . . are deductible.22

In Primuth the taxpayer obtained employment through an
agency, but the Tax Court confronted the distinction between expenses incurred in seeking employment and those incurred in securing
employment, and found that there was no basis for such a differentiation."' Judge Tannenwald summarized the court's reasoning in his
concurring opinion:
[T]he drawing of distinctions based upon the difference
between "seeking" and "securing" employment, upon
whether the fee.., is contingent or payable in any event,
or upon whether the agency's efforts are successful or un16 21 B.T.A. 588 (1930); see Ralph C. Holmes, 37 B.T.A. 865 (1938);
Harold A. Christensen, 17 T.C. 1456 (1952).
1'David J. Primuth, 54 T.C. 374, 379 (1970).
18 51 T.C. 932 (1969).

19 Rev. Rul. 223, 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 57, which states that the Internal
Revenue Service will allow as deductions fees paid to employment agencies
to secure employment.
20 51 T.C. at 935.
21 423 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1970).
22
Id.at 612.
23

54 T.C. at 380.
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successful simply adds unnecessary confusion and complexity to a tax law which already defies understanding
even by sophisticated taxpayers...

Likewise, Judge Simpson in his
there was no legal basis for such
tions for securing employment
employment seems unreasonable

24

concurring opinion reasoned that
a result and that to "allow deducand deny deductions for seeking
and arbitrary."2

Since its decision in Primuth, the Tax Court has been faced
with a similar situation on two occasions and has adhered to its
holding in Primuth. In Guy R. Motto,26 on facts similar to those
2
in Primuth,
the Tax Court cited Primuth as controlling and for
this reason relieved the taxpayer. Again Primuth was controlling in
the recent case of Kenneth R. Kenfield,28 even though the facts
were somewhat different.29
In conclusion, the decision in Primuth and subsequent cases
appears to be bringing some degree of uniformity into an area of the
tax law which has been in confusion for quite some time. It would
appear that in the future one will be able to deduct expenses incurred
in seeking, though not actually securing employment.
James M. Henderson, II

24

Id.at 381. The Internal Revenue Service contended that Rev. Rul.

60-158 only applied in situations where the employment agency fee was
contingent upon the securing of a position and not where the fee was payable
in any event. The court held that this was a "distinction without a difference",
and that the purpose of payment and the results obtained are identical.
25 Id. at 383-84. (emphasis added).
26

27

54 T.C. 558 (1970).

Id. at 559 where the court held that the only difference between this
case and Primuth was the type of employment, an engineer inMotto and a
corporate executive inPrimuth.
28 P-H TAx CT. REP. & MEM. DEC.ff 54.113 (1970).
29
Id.Petitioner was allowed the deduction of the fee paid to the employment agency even though he did not actually go to work at the new employment obtained by the agency. Petitioner did accept the employment but later
decided to remain with his then present employer who apparently offered
him a comparable position to induce him to remain.
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